| HAZOP Team Selection and Management |
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As with any team effort, the quality of the leadership is critical. The leader must somehow allow people to dream up potentially bizarre situations in anticipation that one or two of these situations will actually turn out to be plausible. At the same time, he or she has to keep the hazards analysis on track in terms of schedule and budget. Also, some team members enjoy the brainstorming process so much that they become counter-productive in terms of overall team effort. The leader needs to keep them focused, and to make sure that they move on to the next topic. As with any team effort, the quality of the leadership is critical. The leader must somehow allow people to dream up potentially bizarre situations in anticipation that one or two of these situations will actually turn out to be plausible. At the same time, he or she has to keep the hazards analysis on track in terms of schedule and budget. Also, some team members enjoy the brainstorming process so much that they become counter-productive in terms of overall team effort. The leader needs to keep them focused, and to make sure that they move on to the next topic. Team SizeThe team size will vary according to the nature of the process, the analysis technique and the degree of experience of the individual team members. As shown in Figure 1, the number of hazards identified will increase as the team size increases up to a certain point. Beyond that point, it is likely that adding more people will degrade the quality of the analysis because the discussion is more likely to be difficult to follow and control.Figure 1
Leader / FacilitatorThe team leader is responsible for the overall conduct of the hazards analysis, the quality of the final report, and for ensuring that the project is completed on time and within budget. Some organizations describe the person filling this role as a facilitator. But use of this word can give a misleading impression. (In fact, the scribe will frequently act as the facilitator.) An effective leader actually leads the analysis team. He or she sets the pace, manages different personalities, reads the body language of the team members and adds his or her own thoughts and insights. The leader's job consists of much more than reeling off a set of guidewords in sequence - he or she should actively lead the team. For example, if the team is discussing the handling of a highly hazardous chemical, the leader may decide to let the discussion run on for a long period of time during which some previously un-thought of hazard may be identified. On the other hand, if the team is analyzing some low hazard situation, the leader should move the discussion along promptly. Team leaders have to work with the constraints of budget, schedule and the availability of key people, while meeting their personal and corporate obligations to conduct a professional and responsible analysis. The leader should be from outside the immediate organization of the facility being analyzed and, ideally, will be from a completely independent company for the following reasons:
Larger companies often have a corporate group that leads hazards analyses (and that also conducts safety audits). Personnel from these groups will provide more of an outside perspective than plant people. They will also have a good knowledge of internal standards and policies. However their knowledge of the "realities" of internal company issues and reporting structures may unconsciously affect their independence. In spite of the benefits of using an outsider to lead hazards analyses most companies use their own internal personnel as leaders. They do this because there is usually no direct cost (leader's salary is being paid anyway) so there is no need to negotiate a contract (with its associated liability issues). Also, because internal employees know the processes and organizational systems that are being reviewed, they do not need much time to get up to speed. Some of the attributes of a good leader are discussed below. Process KnowledgeThe leader should have in-depth knowledge of how chemical processes work, but he or she will not know the unit being examined in detail. Nor need the leader be expert on the technology being discussed. (He or she must, however, be able to read the P&IDs fluently.) Indeed, the leader's background in other industries can help generate some very useful cross-fertilization during the team discussions. Challenge the Status Quo AnteOften one of the leader's biggest challenges is to get the team members to accept that serious accidents can happen. This acceptance can be a particular problem in those facilities which have a good safety record. Indeed, the most difficult analyses for a leader can be those where standards are high and the team members consistently exhibit a high level of professionalism. In such cases, the leader can have a hard time persuading the team members that risk never is zero, and serious accidents can happen anywhere and in any place. These team members can have trouble "thinking the unthinkable". They will make statements such as, "I've been here fourteen years, and never seen that" - with the unspoken follow-on, "therefore it can't happen." In these situations the leader needs to, "Comfort the afflicted, and afflict the comfortable". On the other hand, at a facility that has just experienced a serious accident, all personnel readily accept that "it" can happen. Indeed, one of the most effective actions that a corporation can take following a large accident is to have as many employees as possible come from other sites to look at the destruction in order to make them realize that bad events really can occur. Creative ThinkingOne of the leader's most important roles is to generate creative discussions and to stimulate what is sometimes referred to as "helicoptic" thinking, the ability to rise up above a problem, and to see the forest as well as the trees. The leader has to get the team to "think the unthinkable". One way of doing this is by asking "stupid" questions, knowing that these questions will, at times, make him or her look a little foolish. Nevertheless, some of these "stupid" questions may generate a useful discussion, which in turn will encourage other people to think more broadly.If a leader is having trouble generating a discussion, he or she may challenge the team members, and deliberately try to put them on the defensive. Their emotional response may help trigger a useful discussion. Such a conversation may proceed on the following lines:
At this point the team members may start to talk about this and other incidents, if only to prove that there is no problem, and that the leader is completely wrong. But the leader has, in fact, achieved his goal, which was to start an honest and candid discussion; even he did have to stir up some emotions. Casual RemarksThe leader should be sensitive to throw-away comments because these can lead to the identification of a hazard. For example, if the team member says that a certain valve "works OK now", the team leader might pick on the word "now" and find out what the source of the original problem was, and whether it could occur again. Sometimes a leader will observe that one of the team members looks uncomfortable, indicating that they may be aware of a problem, but they are not sure. The leader should be very sensitive to body language, and follow up with the person concerned. Jokes and laughter can also open up new lines of inquiry because they are often indicative of a deep-seated or endemic problem; it is the truth that lies behind a joke that makes it funny. If a team member makes a laughing comment such as, "Management would never pay for this" the leader may want to probe more deeply. He may find, for example, that previous suggestions have been turned down because they were not properly documented or justified; in which case the issue is not lack of money, but lack of communication. "If We Had Unlimited Money"The leader can sometimes generate good ideas by asking the team, "What would you do to improve safety if you have unlimited money (and time and skilled people)?" Such a question can generate a "think the unthinkable scenario". A related question is, "Have we overlooked anything obvious?" A team member may have an opinion as to the cause of a hazard, but may lack the confidence to bring forward that opinion without encouragement. GeneralizationsEffective team leaders develop generalizations from the hazards analysis discussion. For example, the leader may note that many of the identified hazards could be mitigated with better operating procedures. This finding indicates that a general recommendation concerning upgrading procedures may be in order. When presenting the final report to management the leader should provide a few succinct generalizations to do with the findings of the analysis. For example, after one lengthy hazards analysis the leader made a 30-minute presentation to management that summarized many of the 46 recommendations (some of which addressed high risk hazards) with the word 'instrumentation'. He noted that a large percentage of the identified hazards were attributable to outdated or inadequate instrumentation systems, and suggested that management consider development of a high-level strategy for improving the quality of the facility's instrumentation. Team ManagementThe ability to manage and lead a team discussion is a critical ability for a hazards analysis leader. The leader needs to watch out for team members who dominate the discussion, and also for team members who hardly participate. It is important to make sure that everyone contributes their thoughts and experience and insights without restricting the input of others. The leader encourages quiet people to talk, and talkative people to shut up. The team leader must recognize that some participants can become quite defensive, to the point of treating the findings of the analysis as challenges to their professional competence. The leader must make it clear to all that the purpose of the hazards analysis is to ensure process safety and operational integrity, not to challenge the proficiency, competence, or professionalism of any person or group of persons. The leader should not answer his or her own questions or lead the "witnesses" too strongly. An experienced leader will often identify the major hazards as soon as a P&ID is put on the wall and will quickly foresee what findings will probably be generated. However, it is his or her responsibility to lead the team through the thinking process, and not to pre-empt the discussion by coming up with instant answers. Also the leader must recognize that other team members have their own insights, and must be given time to think, particularly if they are unfamiliar with the hazards analysis process. The leader must be particularly sensitive to the rather hesitant comments made by those who are not used to being in meetings, and/or who fear retribution from their bosses for "whistle blowing". The fact that they are speaking at all shows that they have a pressing concern that they wish to share with others. The leader should make every effort to give that person an opportunity to speak. On one HAZOP, for example, the leader quickly noted to himself that a certain valve needed to be locked open. Instead of just saying this however, he had the team work through the thinking process in order to reach the same conclusion. As the team did so, a highly experienced operator, but one who was not used to public speaking, hesitatingly raised an interesting issue: in his facility the term "locked valve" always meant "locked closed valve". He was puzzled as to why the team wanted to close the valve when it should be open. If the leader had jumped straight to the finding, this minor but interesting insight would have been missed. As it was, a second recommendation was generated calling for the standard operating procedures to clearly define what was meant by the phrase "locked valve" and for the Training Department to put everyone through a refresher course on this topic. Finally, developing the discussion unhurriedly will also make sure that the leader has not missed anything or has made unjustified assumptions. Good hazards analysis leaders can suffer from hubris. Knowledge of Actual IncidentsIn the book Study in Scarlet (1887) Dr. Watson enumerates some of Sherlock Holmes' unique characteristics one of which is Knowledge of Sensational Literature - Immense. He appears to know every detail of every horror perpetrated in the century. By studying earlier crimes Holmes is able to apply the lessons learned to current crimes. Like Holmes, an effective hazards analysis leader should possess extensive knowledge of actual incidents that are relevant to the process being analyzed, thus allowing him or her to develop meaningful analogies (examples of some of the more important incidents in the process industries are provided at our Incidents in the Process Industries page.) Experienced leaders may even use the names of major incidents to summarize the state of a facility. For example, one leader once described a certain facility to another leader as containing "many little Flixboroughs". Those three words told the second leader that Management of Change was a problem at the location in question. Knowledge of actual incidents can also help the leader illustrate potential problems to team members who are suffering from the, "but it couldn't happen here" syndrome. Indeed, the leader could do a lot worse than have the team members read literature such as Kletz (1993) and Kletz (1998). One danger associated with having a lot of knowledge and experience to do with actual events is that discussions can degenerate into an almost endless sequence of rather boring war stories. Anyone calling on experience of actual events must be sure that (a) he or she is not just trying to make himself look good, and (b) that appropriate lessons and generalizations are being derived from this knowledge. In many ways, a good hazards analysis team leader has the characteristics of a trial attorney. He or she asks probing questions, and always works to throw the "witness" (the team member who is speaking) a little off balance thus generating fresh insights and new ways of thought. This behavior means that the team leader is not always a "nice guy". (However, unlike the attorney, the team leader is seeking to find positive insights, not to merely affix blame.) Occasionally, a leader may choose to explicitly cross-examine one of the members of the team, particularly if there has been an incident, the follow-up to which may not have been adequate. However, the leader must be careful not to be too tough on those who are unused to having their thought-processes challenged; the purpose of a hazards analysis is to identify hazards, not to put down people. PersonaThe leader does far more than merely call out the guidewords, and organize the team logistics. He or she must set the tone of the hazards analysis through behavior and style. Indeed, the leader should think through the approach that to be selected before the hazards analysis starts. For example, if the hazards analysis is on the critical path of a project or is part of an urgent Management of Change review the hazards analysis team may be under pressure to move quickly, and not to make any substantial changes to the scope of work. In such cases, the leader may have to play the "heavy", making it clear to management that the hazards analysis is going to be conducted professionally, that no corners will be cut, and that the creation of findings will not be influenced by budgetary or scheduling issues. In general, the leader will often find it to be most effective to be sympathetic with working people who are unused to the hazards analysis process, while at the same time being much more assertive with senior managers. Personal PreparationThe team leader should spend as much time as it takes getting ready for the PHA. Before the team meetings actually start he or she must have learned the process technology, studied the P&IDs, read recent incident reports, and made sure that the software is ready to go. Engineering StandardsA PHA team contains people who are expert in the process for which they are responsible, but it is unlikely that they will possess specialist knowledge to cover each and every topic that may be raised. Even if a team member does have expertise in one or two areas such as vessel design, he or she will not know about other topics such as fire protection, secondary containment, and burner management systems. Therefore, one of the roles that the leader can play is in listing standards that can provide expert guidance to specialist problems. The ScribeThe scribe records the team discussion, usually using special software on a laptop computer. Generally the scribe is a full member of the team, and is expected to participate in the discussions. In many cases the scribe is fully qualified to lead; hence he and the leader may switch roles every so often. On other occasions the leader may be forced to accept someone such as a secretary who has lesser technical qualifications. Whatever his or her qualifications, the scribe must be able to screen the team discussion and only record what is germane to the topic being analyzed. The scribe is also usually responsible for preparing interim and final reports under the guidance of the team leader. For larger projects or facilities, the scribe is often the person charged with managing the risk register. Operations / Maintenance ExpertThe operations expert is a very important team member. He will know the unit in great detail, and will be able to explain "how things really work around here". He will also have knowledge of past incidents, including those that were not necessarily serious enough to be reported within the Incident Investigation process, but which nevertheless can provide useful pointers to the hazards analysis team. The only drawback to the experience of the operations expert is that, in some hazards analyses, have the drawback that he or she may have trouble thinking broadly. They know the unit so well, that they cannot visualize any other type of operation other than what they have seen. Hazards analysis teams will often include a maintenance expert also. The leader must be sensitive to the fact that many of the comments made during a hazards analysis can be interpreted as being a criticism of the ability of the maintenance group to keep the plant running. The people making these comments may not realize that they are causing offense - but whenever they make off-hand remarks such as, "Nothing around here works as it used to", the maintenance personnel could take such remarks personally. Yet they are the ones who have probably done a valiant job in keeping the facility running during times of budget cuts and management turmoil. Process ExpertThe process expert supplies knowledge about the process itself. He or she will often be a chemical engineer. Generally, he is expected to explain how the process works, what the basic chemistry is and what would be the process impact of identified hazards. Sometimes the process expert is also the team leader. If this is the case, he or she must make it clear which role they are filling as the discussion progresses. Instrument ExpertThe instrument expert provides expertise on the instruments, the cause and effect charts, the control systems and the safety shut down systems. He or she should be a full time member of the team. SpecialistsAt times, it is appropriate to call in specialists for limited periods of time. For example, if the team is struggling with some specialized issues to do with corrosion, it may choose to call in a corrosion expert for that part of the hazards analysis. Sometimes a team will save up its questions to do with a specialized area - say the shipping of samples to the lab - and deal with them all at once when that particular subject matter expert is present. Sophisticated Use of LanguageHazards analyses often use complex language constructs. A statement such as, "If the valve could leak, a vapor cloud would form, and so we should reduce the pressure" is far from easy to understand, especially for those whose first language is not English. Doubtless all languages could come up with similar examples. If the team members are not fluent in the language being used for the analysis then the quality of the analysis will be degraded. Yet many hazards analysis teams are international, consisting of members from many nations. One HAZOP team, for example, was made up of participants whose respective native tongues were German, Spanish and English. It was agreed that English would be the language of record since all the team members spoke English to varying degrees of fluency. However, the leader, recognizing that people need to think and speak in their own languages, established the following rules:
The One-Minute Engineering DepartmentTypically, hazards analysis teams consist primarily of engineers and others with a technical background. By training and instinct, these people have a tendency to want to solve problems, yet they must understand that the purpose of the analysis is to identify hazards, not to come up with solutions; a hazards analysis team is not a one-minute engineering department. In point of fact, once the meetings are concluded these same people are likely to be the ones who are assigned the task of follow-up. Yet everyone must clearly understand that the role of team member and that of engineering support are different. Another reason for not having the hazards analysis team develop recommendations is that the mental process for finding hazards is quite different from that for solving problems. When finding hazards, the team is looking for problems and hazards. When generating recommendations, the team is in a constructive, problem-solving mode. The two thought processes can be difficult to integrate in a single meeting. If the leader can keep a grip on the tendency of the team to want to solve problems, he or she will find that the meeting proceeds quite quickly - which will please everyone, particularly upper management. | |||||||||||||||
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